Thursday, November 12, 2015
Inclusive Growth: Gender Perspective
Inclusive Growth: Gender Perspective
Baikuntha Aryal[1]
Inclusive
Growth is the buzz word in the contemporary development agenda. Most of
international agencies are persuading their aligned countries and governments
to mainstream this agenda in their development process. Recently International
Monetary Fund decided to launch new training program on Inclusive Growth
Strategy for senior level government officials. The UN agencies are well ahead
in cashing this agenda in their impression areas. The same agenda has been one
of the major post conflict agenda in Nepal. Inclusive Growth broadly covers
inclusiveness of all in the growth process. Consequently, gender comes there.
However, the lack of clear understanding on Inclusive Growth and inadequate
efforts to look this issue through gender sensitive eyes has probably minimized
the benefits that were supposed to be. This paper tries to revolve around this
issue and come up with gender sensitive Inclusive Growth ideas.
1. Background
Inclusive
Growth is generally a vague issue. Running through the dictionaries and some
really good articles, one may get confused. In a narrow sense, the arguments
have been including all the people, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity,
religion, geographical location and physical ability, in the growth process. It
mostly covers the rights of the concerned people and often neglects the roles
and responsibilities part. In broad sense Inclusive Growth is harnessing the
capabilities within the people and making the growth process inclusive and
broad based. Still very little has been talked to link the capabilities and the
rights, ironically almost nil has been talked on roles and responsibilities.
Nepal
has seen a lot of ups and downs during its history began some two centuries and
three quarter. Political instabilities, divide and rule policies, personal egos
of political figures and myopic vision in economic development were some of the
reasons that Nepal failed to stand as a developing country if not developed
one. Resource constrain was blamed but little spelled out about efficient management
of available resources
After
the peoples’ movement of 2006, the agenda of Inclusive Growth popped out and
took no time to spread. The Three Years Interim Plan (2007-10) had Inclusive
Growth as one of the major themes. However, the definition was limited to
including all gender, ethnicity, region, physical abilities, backward
communities and backward religions in the development process. Both approaches
of Inclusive Growth – Mainstreaming and Targeted Programs were adopted to make
the development process more inclusive. Before this plan, the Tenth Plan
(2002-07), which is also known as Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, identified
‘Targeted Programs’ as one of the four strategic pillars. The programs to
support this strategy were basically gender and poverty focused. In the Three
Years Interim Plan (TYIP), more focus were given to the programs and policies
that supported the gender equality, equality in regional and other dimensions.
The
TYIP was one step ahead to address the gender issues. One of the major policies
of this plan was “engendering the macro economic framework”. This meant that
all the works carried out by the women would be recorded in the national
account. The policy itself was quite ambitious, given the inadequate mechanism
to collect those data. However, on the expenditure side, emphasis had been
given to direct the expenses to gender equality and gender responsive.
As
a part of “Engendering Macro Economic Framework” policy, Nepal started Gender
Responsive Budgeting since Fiscal Year 2007/08. This initiative was a
courageous effort of Government of Nepal, as there were limited countries in
the world which were able to track the expenses on gender responsive programs
and projects. Further, the revenue side of Engendering policy was also
implemented in small section of the population. Few policies of tax exemptions
for the women and women involving activities were adopted. Gender Responsive
Budgeting in Nepal has drawn a lot of international attractions. Nepal was even
invited to share its experiences in expenditure tracking in gender responsive
activities in one of the side events “What Women Get?” during recent European
Development Day (26-27 November 2013) program. While Nepal has done a
remarkable job in expenditure side, a lot of concerns on revenue side still
remain.
2.
Inclusive growth
Inclusive
Growth refers to the broad based growth which should be inclusive of the larger
part of a country’s labor force and this should cover all the sectors. The
inclusive growth by and large establishes a direct link between the macro and
micro determinants of growth. This definition, however, is more related to the
use of labor force and its impact on economic growth. This ignores the approach
to harness the capabilities of different section of the population and making
their use in economic development.
Therefore,
the inclusive growth in broader sense is “identifying and harnessing the
potentialities of the labor force and making their use in economic
development”. This definition further demands the equality in benefit sharing
and capacity development of those labor forces, regardless of their ethnicity,
gender, religion, race and any other human and non human determinants. One of
the major dimensions of inclusive growth is the benefits sharing. In a narrow
term, it is non discriminatory wages system and in broader term, it is sharing
of development fruits in an equitable way. Inclusive growth hence enhances the
opportunity for all.
In
Nepalese context, the idea of inclusive growth emerged after the decade long
armed conflict was over in 2006. The voices of the people of the backward
communities and the poverty stricken population were largely unheard in the
past. Although the sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction was always
talked about, but inclusion of all was largely ignored. Even in the Plan
documents after 1990’s peoples’ movement, the broad based economic growth got
the major space, the inclusiveness was hardly spoken. Further, poverty (or
inequality) and economic growth analyses have been conducted separately
traditionally. Recent practices indicate that there may not be a trade-off
between equity and efficiency and it would be a big mistake to separate
analyses of growth and income distribution. Thus inclusive growth can be
defined as raising the pace of growth and enlarging the size of the economy
by providing a level playing field for investment and increasing productive
employment opportunities.
Whatever is the definition, the inclusive
growth largely relates to the raising the incomes of people to reduce the
poverty and reduce the income inequality. In this sense the pro-poor growth
strategy more relates to the inclusive growth. However, the income earning
capacity is dependent on
- Skills
- Access to public goods, education and health services for
example
- Resource endowments such as property rights, intellect
- Freedom to enter into inclusiveness
Given
the slower growth rates in the world in the recent days, the inclusiveness has
been somehow slowed. The recent world growth rate is merely 3 percent per annum
and the reduction of poverty has a slower pace. In Nepalese case alone, while
the growth rate remained nearly 3.5 percent per annum in the last three years,
the poverty reduced by 1.4 percent only.
3.
Gender and Inclusive Growth
Women
constitute the larger part of labor force. Recent census shows that the female
population is higher than the male population. However, several studies show
that the employment is less among the women. This is true in formal and paid
employment case. The story may be different for the informal and unpaid
employment, which the Nepalese women are mostly engaged in. The inclusive
growth demands the inclusiveness of women in capability building, employment
and benefits share. We talk about these issues in bit details in the following
paragraphs.
3.1 Capacity Building
For
the purpose of this article, the capacity building is described in major two
dimensions – education and health. These two dimensions are clearly related to
capabilities of the labor force.
3.1.1
Education
According
to the census, 2011 literacy rate (of the population aged above 5 years) for
Nepal is 65.9 percent. This is 75.1 percent for male and 57.4 percent for
female. The literacy rate for women has gone up remarkably from the last census
of 2001, when it was mere 42 percent. Among the literate, the educational
attainment has also gone up. The data shows that only 4.2 percent of literate
has obtained informal education, while remaining 95.8 percent has gotten the
formal education. Interestingly, the 20.4 percent population has the education
level as SLC or above.
It
is noteworthy that the female literacy has gone up and the net enrolment rate
in basic level (grade 1-8) among boy and girl children is at parity. Earlier
there was a big difference in this rate. However, in the secondary school, the
difference in net enrolment rate between girl and boy children is still high.
Another aspect of education is dropout rate. The dropout rate among girl
children is higher than in among boy children. Engagement in household
activities for the girl child is one of the major reasons for this higher
dropout rate, while the lack of gender friendly infrastructure in educational
institutions is another factor. But recent intervention to build the separate
toilets for girl children and distribution of sanitary napkins during
menstruation period has reduced the dropout rates. Further, ‘Education for All’
program has also played remarkable role in educating the girl children.
The
slower improvement in educational services has slowly increased the
capabilities of the women and the results are being shown in the educational
attainments and their access to policy making.
3.1.2
Health
Nepal
has done good progress in Health sector. The infant mortality rate, child mortality
rate has gone down sharply in last 20 years time. Nepal was recognized by the
international agencies for its achievement on maternal health. The number of
health service centers and health personnel has improved. Although there is not
distinct data base is available for health services for male and female, the
significant improvement in health services signifies to life expectancy of 69.1
years.
Availability
of health services definitely improves the health conditions of both males and
females. But still a large chunk of women population is deprived of proper
health services. In some cases, they do not have access to the services and in
some cases they cannot afford the price of health services. This has seriously
affected women’s health and thereby their capabilities. However, in a macro
level, capabilities of women have increased given the improvement of health
services.
3.2 Employment
In
the past, there was vast difference among men and women in the formal sector
employment. Still the difference is high, but slowly decreasing. Women
participation has increased even in the civil service. The second amendment to
Civil Service Act opened up reservation policy for women. This allows certain
quota for women, Dalits, Madhesis, Janajatis and backward regions. This
has also helped women to come into the civil service. Given the higher
capabilities than before with good education, larger number of women employment
is available in the nongovernmental sector too. In the factory level also the
number of women worker has increased because of equal wage policy.
But
women employment is still large at the informal sector. Women’s work still does
not come into the national accounts and they are very much engaged in household
chores. Even in the educated families, women are more in household activities
than their male members of the families. Although few changes have been seen,
the female member needs to work in the kitchen even if she is employed
somewhere and male member is often refrained from doing so. This is not only
the problem of education and type of employment, but cultural orientation has
also something to do with.
3.3
Benefit share
Benefit
sharing among male and female is normally looked by the expenditure
perspectives. Moreover, it is related to the level of wage they get. As said
above Nepal has been initiating the gender responsive budgeting since last
seven years. The expenditure on directly responsive program and projects has
been increasing while the expenditure on neutral types of activities has been
decreasing. Although it is a complex job to analyze all the expenditure with
gender eyes, Nepal has been able to identify which activity is more gender
responsive. The following chart shows the percentage of gender responsive
budget in total budget.
The
above chart shows that the directly gender responsive budget has been almost
doubled in seven years while the neutral to gender responsive budget has gone
down by more than 20 percentage points.
Another
aspect of benefit sharing is depicted by the wage rate too. Before 1990, there
was differential wage system in the factory level. Women would get lower wage
for the same kind of job. But after the restoration of multiparty system in
1990, the wage difference was removed. However, the wage difference still
remain in the informal sector
The
third aspect of benefit share is the impact of government expenditure. This can
be analyzed through the time saving and access to the resources. Although the
government expenditure on infrastructure is both for men and women, but in many
cases it has helped women to increase their access to the public services such
as health services, drinking water, fuels. These have reduced women’s time
significantly. On the other hand this has helped them to retain their health,
at least by avoiding long hours walk for finding drinking water and firewood.
4.
Opportunities
While
talking about inclusive growth, one should not forget about the opportunities
for all. The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007 has identified Rights to
Equality as Fundamental Rights. But this right does not necessarily ensure the
opportunities and participation of all. Although this right does not
discriminates any gender, the capabilities and participation are not
guaranteed. This right is similar to “the doors of five star hotels are open
for everyone” but entering into the five star hotels, one has to have the
affording capacity. Then only (s)he has the opportunity and (s)he can
participate.
The
core of inclusive growth is to make the people capable of getting
opportunities. Capability without opportunity and opportunity without
capability, both do not yield a good result. Hence to make the inclusive growth
successful, enough investment is needed in the capabilities development.
5.
What to do?
To
make inclusive growth a success strategy, the investment is needed to develop
the capacity, increase opportunity and increase participation. Here are few
suggestions.
a. Increase investment in human capital, such as education
and health
b. Increase investment in social sector, such as drinking
water and hygiene
c. Increase investment in infrastructure such that all
population can enjoy the results
d. Mobilize community organization for awareness and
capacity building
e. Support community led programs
f. Exercise Corporate Social Responsibilities by the private
sector to support the inclusive growth process
g. Adopt both targeted programs and mainstreaming of large
part of population
This
list can be longer and longer. But the main thing is that both for inclusive
growth and for gender equality, the focus is needed on capacity building so
that the opportunity comes behind automatically.
6.
Final words
Inclusive
growth is not a new and different concept than the broad-based growth concept.
But this is more specific than the previous one. For this, participation of all
the population is required and their capacity needs to be developed for
participating. Government intervention is a must and private and nongovernmental
sector should also be cooperative.
[1] Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance.
The views and arguments presented here are author’s personal and not
necessarily represent that of the organization he is associated to.
Does the Participants’ behaviour affect Management of Community Forestry in Nepal?
Does the Participants’ behaviour affect Management of Community
Forestry in Nepal
Baikuntha Aryal
Abstract
Forestry plays an important role in rural
livelihoods in Nepal Nepal
1.
Introduction
Forests
play a crucial role in livelihoods of rural Nepal Nepal Nepal Nepal rely on fuelwood as
their primary fuel for cooking and heating (Edmonds
Forestry
and forest resource management are taken as the secondary support activities in
Nepal Forest provides a
significant amount of income too. Although fuelwood used in the rural areas is
seldom traded, there is a significant demand in small urban areas and from
brick industries that is met by traders who purchase from rural fuelwood
collectors (World Bank, 2003). Other sources of income from forests are timber
production by local communities or by commercial private sector agencies. The
other part of the forest income comes through NTFPs (Non Timber Forest
Products). The trade of NTFPs is being practised legally and illegally. Because
of dominancy of illegal trade, the major chunk of the income from NTFPs does
not appear in the national accounting system. In some part of the country, NTFP
provides more than 50 percent of total household income.
Community
forestry has been a priority programme area of the forestry sector in Nepal Nepal Nepal Nepal
This short paper tries to assess the effects of
participants’ behaviour in management of community forestry. For this purpose,
it uses small set of data from Dakshinkali and Chhaimale VDCs of Kathmandu
district. The paper first finds the determinants of participation in community
forestry and then it analyzes the participants’ behaviour in the management
side by using game theory approach.
2. Determinants of participation in
community forestry management
The
data for the analysis is taken from Dakshinkali and Chhaimale VDCs of Kathmandu
district. 39 households were taken from Dakshinkali VDC while 36 households
were taken from Chhaimale VDC. This data was collected by the author in
2004/05. Although the sample size is small, it is believed to be helpful in
determining the factors of participation. Simple probit analysis was done to
find the major factors to determine the participation in community forestry.
The
decision of a household to participate in community forestry management is
determined by different factors. The results show that the large family households and households with
agriculture as main occupation are more likely to participate in community
forestry. Similarly, household with young and educated heads are also likely to
join the program. It indicates the growing concerns over nature conservation
and awareness to safeguard the resources among young and educated households.
It is interesting to note that the female-headed households are more likely to
participate in the programme. On the other hand, relatively richer households
are less likely to join the program as the forest is one of the lowest return
activities. Likewise, there is a little chance that the households that are far
from forests join the program. This is simply because farther the forest, less
concerns of conserving it.
In the following section, the two determinants (income
level and distance to the forests) are considered to analyze the individual
behaviour of the participants in community forest management.
3.
Games and Community Forestry Management
3.1
Game Theory
The game theory suggests different strategies for the
players to play for getting the benefits to them. This is the study of multi person
decision problems. The famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game was perhaps
the beginning of game theory in which the two suspected persons were separately
asked about the crime. The police did not have any evidence against them. So
they were provided different alternatives about the jail term. This was
intended to find out whether the suspected persons were convict or not. But it
gave the room to the convicts to find the best outcomes for themselves. They
had the options either to cooperate and get the freedom or to defect and be
sentenced. They had the option to choose for their betterment. A number of
different types of games were developed afterwards but the main objective was
to find the better personal/social outcomes.
In the same way, the main objective of the community
forestry program is to get cooperation for a better social outcome. The game
theory, if applied, can be fruitful in regard to the conservation of forest
resources and for the better social outcome. The core idea behind the game
theory is to find the Nash equilibrium (an equilibrium where the players do not
have incentive(s) to change the strategies). However, Nash equilibrium does not
guarantee optimality from a social view but does for the individual. There are
different types of games that can be applied in this area. Broadly, there are
two types: static and dynamic games.
Static game
In this type, first the players simultaneously choose
actions; then they receive payoffs that depend on the combination of actions
just chosen. In this study, I restrict attention to games of complete
information, i.e. each player’s payoff function is common knowledge among all
the players. The assurance game (AG) and chicken game (CG) are these kind of
static game. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is the first choice for this game
and changing the payoffs accordingly we find the way out.
Dynamic
game
Since the forest resource is a renewable resource and
can be used for an infinite period of time, its users may have the complete
knowledge about its use by different users. In this study, I restrict to
complete information among the players by which I mean that at each move in the
game the player with the move knows the full history of the play of the game
thus far. The main dynamic games with complete information are Stackelberg’s
sequential move and backward induction.
Since the forest can be used for an infinite period,
it is looked for a repeated period. The reason for looking for repeated game is
that it captures the facts of life that when people interact over time, threats
and promises concerning future behaviour may influence current behaviour. The
central issue in all dynamic games is credibility and dynamic game of complete
information may have more than one Nash equilibriums, but some of these may
involve non-credible threats or promises (Gibbons, 1992). Thus we look for the
sub-game (a part of original game, i.e. the part from a particular point in the
game and all moves that follows this game). The sub-game perfect Nash equilibriums
pass a credibility test. Thus applying the two types of dynamic games mentioned
above, we try to find the Pareto optimality through sub-game(s)
Before beginning the discussion of application of game
theory in collective action, it is worthwhile to discuss about some of
prerequisites for it. The first one is the moral norms:
-
One must always
contribute towards public goods, and
-
One must not
take a free ride when others are contributing.
The second is a set of conditions as:
-
few information
asymmetries (personal relations, observability, transparency)
-
repeated
interactions
-
similar norms
-
less or no
benefits from free riding
-
possibility of
punishment
With these prerequisites the player in a complete
information game cooperates if others are suspicious and does not cooperate if
others are too generous thinking that even if (s)he does not cooperate, others
would cooperate and (s)he gets the benefits. Furthermore, in this type of
games, the reputation of the player matters, i.e. if the player is altruist, (s)he
always cooperate and if nasty, (s)he always defects.
3.2.
Games in the CF management
A number of substantial literatures can be found using
the game theory in resource management problems. They are mainly applying
binary choice models (Angelsen, 2001). The discussion about the game theory in
CF management in this paper is basically focuses how simultaneous and
sequential games can be played by the members of the user groups in CF
management. From above probit analysis, the factors determining the
participation in CF management are found as number of household members, level
of education and the occupation of the household members. The income level and
the distance to the forest have negative impacts on the participation in the CF
management. On the basis of this information, we try to apply the games between
-
Members of the
user group (Rich and Poor)
-
Members of the
user group (Closer and farther from the forest)
a. Game between
rich and poor members of the group
From the probit analysis, it is seen that as the
income increases, the probability of participating in the CF management
decreases. Whatever the reason maybe, the richer households seem to be less
concerned about conserving the forests. But being the member of the same
village, they cannot avoid joining it otherwise they cannot extract the forest
products as per rule. The poor on the other hand, have subsistence constraint.
They have to collect the forest products for their subsistence use. Even if the
richer members do not cooperate, the poor have to maintain the forest resources
for their own sake. Furthermore, the poor households tend to conserve the
forest for the safety nets and rich households tend to convert the forest into
money and the riches dominate in the decision-making. So there is a possible
free riding over the poor members of the group. It can be illustrated by the
following payoff matrix:
|
Poor
|
|||
|
Rich
|
|
Maintain
|
Neglect
|
|
Maintain
|
15,5
|
13,2
|
|
|
Neglect
|
17,1
|
2,0
|
|
In the above payoff matrix, if Poor (P) maintains, the
Rich (R) tends to neglect, as the payoff for him is more than to maintain. If P
chooses to neglect then R chooses to maintain. In this case P again has to move
to maintain because neglecting is less beneficial than maintaining. When P
chooses to maintain, R chooses to neglect. Since R has the complete information
about P, it chooses to neglect. So the Nash equilibrium in this case is at (17,
1) where rich free rides over the poor. Let’s look at the other payoff matrix
as in below:
|
Poor
|
|||
|
Rich
|
|
Maintain
|
Neglect
|
|
Maintain
|
15,4
|
13,5
|
|
|
Neglect
|
17, -1
|
2,2
|
|
Here, Nash equilibrium is at (13, 5), i.e. rich maintains but the poor
neglects. If R chooses to maintain, P chooses to neglect. If R chooses to
neglect, P again chooses to neglect. But if P chooses to neglect, then R should
choose to maintain because it has higher payoff in maintaining than in
neglecting. Here, poor free rides over the riches. The reason for this is that poor
maybe too poor to maintain and hence gives up maintaining.
In the collective action, this is always possible that
one free rides over the others. The problem of free riding can be minimized by
imposing some type of punishment in the form of fines. In the first example,
where rich free rides over poor, let us assume that 3 units be taken from the
neglecting member and be provided that to maintaining member in order to
provide incentives for the members who maintain it. The new payoff matrix will
be
|
Poor
|
|||
|
Rich
|
|
Maintain
|
Neglect
|
|
Maintain
|
15,5
|
16, -1
|
|
|
Neglect
|
14,4
|
2,0
|
|
Now, both rich and poor tend to maintain. If R chooses to maintain, then
P also chooses to maintain. If R chooses to neglect, then P chooses to
maintain. When P maintains, R should also maintain, as the payoff is higher
there. If P neglects, R maintains that lead P to maintain again. Hence the
problem of free riding is solved. The same policy helps to minimize poor’s free
riding over rich.
The above games show that playing game in the
community forestry management gives the better social outcome as both rich and
poor maintain the forest resources and get benefited from it. The main
objective of the community forestry is to fulfil the
daily requirements of fodder, forages, bedding materials for animals, firewood
and timber and hence contribute to the rural livelihood. But he empirical
studies do not support it. According to Malla (2000), sustainable management
of, and equitable access to, CF has not been a universal result. Some recent
studies indicated that CF in the mid hills is not able to contribute significantly
to the livelihoods of very poor and marginalized sections of the community due
to its failure to tale into account equity and distributional issues (Adhikari,
2002).
b. Game between
members close to and far from the forest
The probit analysis clearly showed that the distance
matters in the participation in CF management. If the household is far from the
forest it is likely that it does not join the CF. Since the
interest of these two types of households is different to each other, they
prefer different games to play. Chicken game (CG) is preferred for the members
who are closer to the forest since they experience more disincentives if the
forest is not managed well, i.e. they have to bear immediate effect of the
deforestation. The chicken game gives them a kind of security that if one fails
to maintain other can take it over. In any case they do not loose the benefits
of forest products that can be collected from the forests.
Assurance
game (AG) is preferable for the members farther from the forest since they get
benefits by the maintenance done by the members closer to the resources. Since
the members have complete information about other’s move, one member of the
group gets benefit by cooperating if other member cooperates. This is a kind of
Tit for Tat. If others maintain, they also maintain and if others
neglect they also neglect. This happens within the households far from the
forests. But they have to play the game with other members of the group who are
closer to the forests, and the strategies then will be different for all. So
here we assume two players from two different locations. In this case, there
are two players (one is chicken game player and other is assurance game
player). This will be a mixed game. Below is the example of payoff matrix that
shows how this looks like.
|
AG
|
|||
|
CG
|
|
Maintain
|
Neglect
|
|
Maintain
|
10,5
|
8,4
|
|
|
Neglect
|
12,0
|
0,2
|
|
With this type of payoff, the players cannot reach at the equilibrium.
Neglecting gives the better payoff for the CG player. This leads AG player to
neglect. If AG player neglects, then CG chooses to maintain. This forces AG to
maintain. But in this case CG does not want to maintain. This goes and goes and
equilibrium cannot be attained. So, the simultaneous move does not work and
sequential move is needed.
In a sequential game, one player acts as a leader and
other acts as a follower. Stackelberg’s sequential game is appropriate in this
case. Stackelberg’s sequential move can be better decided by backward induction
method.
(10,5)
AG M
N
M (8,4)
CG 
N M (12,0)
AG N
(0,2)
The above tree helps the player(s) to decide to which
strategy to adopt. When CG player is the leader, and has the complete
information about the AG player, (s)he knows that if (s)he chooses to maintain,
AG player also chooses to maintain (5 is greater than 4). If he chooses to
neglect, AG player chooses to neglect (2 is greater than 0). Between these two
strategies, (s)he will choose to maintain because it gives her/him better
payoff (10 against 0). So the optimal strategy is to cooperate for both the
players. If the AG player is the leader, then the decision tree will be as
follows:
(10,5)
CG M
N
M (12,0)
AG 
N M (8,4) CG N
(0,2)
The above tree shows the strategies to be taken if the
AG player leads the game. With the complete information of other side, the AG
player knows that if (s)he maintains then CG player neglects (because 12 is
greater than 10). If (s)he chooses to neglect, then CG player maintains as the
payoff is higher (8 against 0). Between these two strategies, AG player chooses
to adopt neglecting because (s)he will be better off with this strategy (4 is
greater than 0). Hence if the AG player starts the game, CG maintains and AG
neglects.
Here, in our example CG players are the households
living close to the forests and AG players are the households living far from
the forests. If the households close to the forests start the game, then both
the households far from and close to the forests are forced to maintain. If the
households far from the forests do not maintain even if the households close to
the forest maintain, then those who are closer to the forests enjoy most of the
benefits. If they do not maintain, then they loose the forest products that
should be supplemented by buying in the local market. This leads to increased
expenditure and less benefits. Moreover, effect of deforestation and
unavailability of forest products lead to less access to the forest for them
and hence they suffer. So negligence in conservation means increased negative
impact for them. On the other hand, if both cooperate, then both get more
benefits resulting in better forest conservation and secured forest products.
If the households far from the forests start the game,
then they will neglect but the households close to the forests maintain it. For
the households close to forest, the forest is the safety net so that they tend
to maintain it. Moreover, the easier access to the forest enables them to
collect forest products easier than for the households far from the forest.
Also since they have to bear immediate effect of deforestation, they prefer to
maintain it. On the other hand, the households, far from the forests get
benefits from the forest, which is maintained by the households close to the
forests. Also since they know that the households close to the forests maintain
it and they don’t bother about it. They are not directly affected by the
deforestation like the households close to the forests. So they neglect and the
households close to the forest maintain. Hence, in any case, the households
close to the forests tend to maintain the forest resources.
4. Role of market in community forestry
The above probit analysis ignores the impact of market
on the participation in CF management. As there is a strong linkage between
market and the resources, the role of market in CF management cannot be ruled
out. Though the necessary data was unavailable to analyse this, from probit
analysis and the game between rich and poor members, some conclusions can be
drawn.
-
Increase in
income leads to the low participation in common property management. This means
if the market is introduced, then the rich members tend to commercialise the
forest products as they can afford it.
-
The poor
members take the forest as safety nets and tend to conserve it. But at the cost
of poor, the riches harvest more and exploit the forest more.
-
Unless the
reward and punishment system is strong, the bribery (because of free riding
problem) and theft of forest products likely to happen.
But these issues need to be examined closely and
enough information is needed for it.
5. Conclusion
The main objective of the paper was to find the
determinants of the participation in the community forestry management and
assess the possibility of applying game theory in the CF management. The
analysis is based on the small data set of 75 households of two villages of Kathmandu district. From the probit analysis it was found
that the number of household members, the education and agriculture based
households increased the probability of participation in the management of
community forestry. The age of the household head, income and the distance from
the household to the forest decreased the probability of participation.
On the basis of the probit analysis, it was seen
whether the game theory could be applied in the community forestry management.
On the basis of probit result, the two different sets of different players were
assumed. The players were divided into rich and poor members of the user groups
in one game and households close to and far from the forest in another game.
Though it could not be decided which game is suitable for the better management
of community forestry, it was found that the game theory could be helpful in
getting the better social outcomes. The first game (between rich and poor)
showed that the free riding could be minimized with the provision of strong
rules over non-cooperation. It also showed how the non-cooperating members
could be motivated to be cooperative one. The second game showed that the
better outcomes could be found if the game was led appropriately. However, the
paper is unable to decide which game is suitable in the common property
management. This raises some policy concerns on how to involve all the
participants in better management of community forest and make the maximum out
of it.
This simple analysis shows that the more realistic
game theory models can be developed and can be played with the real payoffs
determined on the basis of the cost and benefits involved in the participation
in the community forestry program.
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